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iAbstract
The size of the informal economy in Kazakhstan declined from 42.6% in 1999 to 33.8%
in 2015. The informal economy can make an important contribution to solving the problem of
fiscal deficit without forgoing economic growth and employment. In my thesis, I am evaluating
the effect of competition stemming from informal firms on the of formal enterprises. I conduct
fixed and changing structure analysis to understand the underlying factors behind the decline
in the informal sector competition in Kazakhstan. In my research I use European Bank for Re-
construction and Development’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance (BEEPs)
2008-2009 and 2012-2013 surveys. This is the period that covers financial crisis and enables
the study of the structure of the informal competition faced by registered firms at the micro
level. The present study utilises firm-specific variables, industry specific variables and busi-
ness environment. For corruption and taxes I use industry averages to address the issue of
endogeneity. My findings suggest that more than 90% of the decline in the informal competi-
tion can be attributed to the socio-economic changes. Focusing on the observed heterogeneity
the main contributors to the decline in the rate of the informal competition are due to an edu-
cated workforce, access to finance, losses due to theft, transportation as an obstacle to current
operations and the services sector. The changes in firm size, taxes and labour regulations have
kept competition from decreasing even further.
Keywords: Informal Economy, Competition Against Informal Firms, Kazakhstan.
JEL Classification: E26, O17, P29
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11 Introduction
In developing countries, informality accounts for between a third and a half of all economic activity
(La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). Competitors’ practices from the informal sector is the number
one obstacle in the business environment in Kazakhstan (EBRD BEEPS V Survey, 2013), though
the proportion of firms competing against unregistered firms in the country has decreased by 2.2
percentage points in between years 2009 and 2013 to 32.9%. The firms experiencing competition
with unregistered entities constitutes 28.1% and 32.2% in 2009 and 2013 of the labour force,
respectively (EBRD BEEPs). Recovery of the economy and commodity prices have contributed to
the decline in informal competition rate in Kazakhstan since 2009.
In the literature, there is no consensus on the definition of the informal economy. According to
the International Labour Organisation the informal economy refers to “all economic activities by
workers and economic units that are – in law or in practice – not covered or insufficiently covered
by formal arrangements. Their activities are not included in the law, which means that they are
operating outside the formal reach of the law; or they are not covered in practice, which means
that – although they are operating within the formal reach of the law, the law is not applied or not
enforced; or the law discourages compliance because it is inappropriate, burdensome, or imposes
excessive costs”.1 The informal economy is also known as ’undeclared’, ’grey’, ’underground’,
’hidden’ or ’shadow’ economy. The most important and often cited causes of the informal economy
are: taxes (direct and indirect) and social security burden (De Soto, 1989; Dreher et al, 2005;
Johnson et al., 2000; Lacko, 2000; Friedman et al, 2000), labour market regulations (Lacko, 2000),
the quality of public goods and services, and corruption (Buehn and Schneider, 2012; Dreher and
1ILO: Conclusions concerning decent work and the informal economy, International Labour Conference, 90th
Session (Geneva, 2002).
2Schneider, 2006; Friedman et al, 2000), and high level of bureaucracy and the state of the formal
economy (Schneider et al.,2010; Schneider and Enste, 2000).
According to La Porta and Shleifer (2008) there are three main views of the role of the informal
firms. First, the "romantic view" states that informal firms will eventually become the engine of the
economic growth unless the government stops them. Second, the "parasite view" claims that the
informal firms unfairly compete with formal enterprises and undermine economic growth. Third,
the "dual view", according to which the informal firms are highly inefficient, do not contribute to
economic growth and do not impose any threat to formal entities. The informal firms use lower
quality inputs, hire more than formal entities labour and have lesser access to finance and public
goods (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). The BEEPs data on Kazakhstan supports the dual point
of view, since only 1.5% of firms have started as informal and became formal afterwards. The
dualistic model of economic development prevailed in the 1960s took its lead from Lewis (1959).
In his model, while the formal economy symbolizes progress, industrialisation, modernity and
advancement, the informal economy was portrayed as backward, pre-industrial, under-developed
and traditional. After a decade, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) report on Kenya
(1972) and Hart (1973) refined the perceived status of the "informal sector" to an important source
of employment and income, noting that the informal sector provides goods and services that would
not be otherwise available and affordable to most people. The concept of self-employed individuals
being informal workers initially emerged in the third world countries in an effort to recognise the
massive number of informal street vendors, micro-entrepreneurs, and petty traders (ILO, 1972 and
Hart, 1973). OECD reports that the worldwide working population is approximately 3 billion of
whom 1.8 billion are in the informal economy (Jutting and Laiglesia, 2009). 2 Nowadays, it is
21.7 billion are poor, who live on less than two dollars a day and depend entirely on their labour for survival.
3widely accepted that the informal economy is sizeable and an expanding feature of the modern
global economy (ILO, 2002; Schneider, 2008; Williams et al., 2014).
The focus of this paper is to evaluate the determinants of the informal competition on the
formal enterprises. Using BEEPs datum, I analyse the determinants of the decline in the informal
competition in Kazakhstan over time due to observable heterogeneity and structural change. In
doing this, I specify a flexible model accounting for the documented determinants of the informal
competition in the literature and use the firm-specific variables: age, size, access to finance, percent
of educated workforce, losses due to theft; industry specific variables: corruption and taxes; and
business environment: transportation and labour regulations. There are only limited number of
studies assessing the relative roles of these variables on the informal competition in the context of
Kazakhstan.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the business environment in
Kazakhstan and provides a literature review. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the data and methodology,
respectively. Section 5 presents empirical results, and Section 6 concludes with policy recommen-
dations.
2 Business Environment in Kazakhstan and Literature Review
The size of the informal sector in any country is a good indicator of the level of competition
encountered by the formal firms (Gonzalez and Lamanna, 2007). Table 1 provides the size of the
shadow economy in between years 1999 and 2015 in Kazakhstan. The average size of the shadow
economy in Kazakhstan was 37.8% of GDP, below the average of 6 ex-USSR countries and well
above the average in Central Asian region for the time period 1999-2007 (Schneider et al., 2010).
4The size of the shadow economy was only 17% in late1980s, it then reached to its highest level
in 1999 and has been declining since then as shown in Figure 1 and Table 1. There was only
one upward jump by half a percentage point in 2008 due to the financial market crisis of 2008.
Schneider and Williams (2013) discuss that the size of the shadow economy negatively correlates
with economic cycles. The period of the 1990s in Kazakhstan can be described in terms of negative
real GDP growth with a minimum of −12.6% in 1994. The size of the shadow economy in the
1990s provided in Table 1 is obtained using the electricity consumption approach. The pitfall of
one input method is that a single parameter cannot capture the complexity of the shadow economy.
Since the shadow economy is present in the production, labour, and money markets (Schneider,
2016), it may very well be the case that the size of the shadow economy in the 1990s was even
higher.
Table 1: Share of the Shadow Economy
Size of Shadow Economy
Average Average Average Average
1986-90 1990-93 1994-95 1999-2015
Johnson et al Lacko Johnson et al Lacko Johnson et al Lacko Schneider*
Kazakhstan 17% 13% 22.2% 29.8% 34.2% 38.2% 37.8%
ex-USSR** 16.7% 16.2% 25.7% 34.9% 35.3% 43.6% 40.65%***
Source: Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro, 2010; Schneider, 2016
Schneider and Enste’s calculations using values from Johnson, Kaufman, and Schleifer (1997, Table 1,
p182-183), and Johnson, Kaufman, and Zoido-Lobaton (1998, p351), Lacko (1999, Table 8, p55).
Household electricity consumption method is used in Johnson et al. and Lacko, Multiple Indicators
Multiple Causes (MIMIC) method is used in Schneider et al.
* Authors’ calculations based on data from Schneider (2016, page 17, Table 2).
** Former USSR, average for 12 countries: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
Republic, Latvia, Lithania, Moldavia, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
***weighted by population average for 6 former USSR countries, including Kyrgys Republic, Tajikistan,
Russian Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Armenia.
There was a substantial decrease in informal employment in between years 2011 and 2012.
5This could be due to the end of the financial crisis in the country. Rudkowski (2011) shows that
almost 70% of informal workers live in rural areas and 62% work in agriculture in Kazakhstan,
although informality is also common in construction, transport, and trade sectors. The agricul-
tural and rural informality is to a larger extent "natural"; therefore, it can hardly be formalised in
Kazakhstan.
Figure 1: Share of the shadow economy and real GDP growth of Kazakhstan, 1999-2015
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Schneider, 2016 (MIMIC method) and Statistical
Committee, Republic of Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan has a relatively favourable tax regime, and its ease of doing business index has im-
proved substantially in the last ten years (World Bank, 2014). The question is then why informality
is still high in Kazakhstan, a middle-income country, when informality is typically associated with
low-income countries? According to Johnson et al.(1997), for the transitional countries, the main
cause of informality is neither higher taxes nor extensive regulation, but the corruption, which
actually drives firms to the shadow economy in the first place, and the weak rule of law. As for
Kazakhstan the sizeable informal competition is due to low institutional quality and excessive reg-
6ulations in financial markets (Abdih and Medina, 2013).
Figure 2: Formal and Informal Employment in Kazakhstan, 2005-2015
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Committee of Statistics, Republic of Kazakhstan
In percent are the numbers for informal employment in Kazakhstan
Friedman et al. (2000) document that more regulation is associated with a larger informal
economy using the data for 69 countries, and more importantly entrepreneurs become informal
to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption, rather than avoiding official taxes. Johnson
et al. (1998) show that countries where the law financed by tax revenues have smaller informal
economies. Possible ways to decrease competition from informal firms are having lower tax rates,
fewer laws and regulations, stronger institutions, and a lower level of corruption (Williams et al.,
2013). In the Tax Code of Republic of Kazakhstan, adopted in 2008, as a measure to support eco-
nomic diversification, the government placed a greater tax burden on the energy sector while article
428 of the Tax Code gave the small firms an opportunity to operate under a special tax regime. Ac-
cording to the this article, firms with less than 25 employees having profits less than 17,000 USD
7before taxes for limited liability partnerships and 9,000 USD for individual entrepreneurs, pay a
corporate tax rate of 3% instead of 20%. The rest of the tax schedule can be considered as low;
value-added tax (VAT) - 12%, corporate tax - 20%, including deductibles - 3% , social tax - 11%,
pension contributions - 10% and income tax rate of 10%. In comparison, in Western Europe, the
VAT is 20% and the average top personal income tax rate is 50%. 3 According to the Compre-
hensive Plan to Counteract the Shadow Economy 2014-2015, for the period 2007-2013 the loss
of budget revenue in terms of VAT accounted for 193 billion tenge or 1.7 billion USD. 4 5 Using
the data from 2016 OECD report on Kazakhstan and the total number of informal employees from
Statistical Committee of Kazakhstan, I have estimated the loss of tax revenue in 2014 due to in-
formal employment approximately at 70.7 million USD. This corresponds to only 1.7% of total
income tax revenue for the government.
To tackle the problem of tax evasion in Kazakhstan, the government has recently launched a
third wave of legalisation and second wave of privatisation, which worked well the previous time.
6 As a result of the very first amnesty, about 3,000 citizens of Kazakhstan legalized more than 480
million US dollars. Legalisation of 2006-2007 was subject not only to financial assets, but also
movable and immovable property. As a result, property was legalized for 844.7 billion tenge or 6.8
billion US dollars (8.3% of GDP in 2006)7. The Republican budget received 59.6 billion tenge or
3World Bank’s Doing Business Index ranked Kazakhstan 17th by ease of paying taxes. The Tax Code of 2008, was
created with the intention to decrease tax rates while increasing tax compliance and broadening the tax base. However,
according to the World Bank (2014) report the Tax Code "has not fully succeeded and created shortfall in the non-oil
revenue in the government’s budget".
4The average exchange rate for the period 2007-2013 according to National Bank of Kazakhstan was 108.9
KZT/USD.
5In the Comprehensive Plan to Counteract the Shadow Economy 2014-2015 the definition of pseudo-entrepreneur
is not given.
6“Legalisation is defined as a procedure whereby the state recognises the rights to property ejected from the lawful
economic turnover with the purpose of concealment of income and/or property where the right to the property was
not duly formalised/documented or property that was formalised/documented to an inappropriate person" Source: The
Legalisation Law
7Legalisation fee was 10%, source: The Legalisation Law
8483 million US dollars as a levy for legalization8.
The sizeable loss of tax revenue shows how the informal economy undermines fair competition
among firms and prevents the creation of regular employment with full social protection, such as
insurance and pension schemes. The informal economy also causes production inefficiencies,
as businesses not legally registered typically have limited access to finance, public services and
advertising (Schneider & Williams, 2013). Typically, informal firms operate at the regional level
and have no possibility to grow into the national, let alone international level (Schneider and Enste,
2000). Hudson et al. (2009) argues that informal competition decreases with the size of a firm in
the formal economy.
The access to finance is a serious obstacle to doing business by formal firms (La Porta and
Shleifer, 2008. Straub (2005) demonstrates that when the financial system, including retail bank-
ing and capital markets, becomes more developed, the magnitude of the shadow economy drops
because as the opportunity cost of informality increases with being excluded from the system.
The second-tier banks’ lending expansion in Kazakhstan was in line with the economic growth
and comparatively high interest rates on retail loans have been making lending to businesses less
attractive (OECD, 2016). Corporate and retail sectors lending were hit hard during the financial
crisis with negative portfolio growth by 4.1% and 6.5%, respectively (Figure 3). In 2009 the re-
tail and corporate lending growth rate was negative; however, since 2012 the retail loan portfolio
has increased by 30% though corporate lending climbed by only 6% in real terms (OECD, 2016).
Hence the access to finance to formal firms is currently a substantial issue in Kazakhstan, which
forces formal firms to rely on their own funding. The statement that informal firms may decide
8Source: The law on the amnesty of citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan in connection with the legalization of
their money, and The Legalisation Law; and their proceedings
9to become formal in order to have an access to finance is weak in Kazakhstan since the banking
sector is in crisis. As for the capital market in Kazakhstan, it is underdeveloped with an average
market capitalisation rate of 25% over 2010-2012 and slight increase to 27% in 2015, and external
sources of financing are limited (OECD, 2016) .9
Figure 3: Total size of loan portfolio of second-tier banks in Kazakhstan (in millions KZT)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from National Bank of Kazakhstan.
Tedds (2010) argues the commonality of participation in the informal sector is related to firm
size as smaller firms are more likely to participate in the informal economy than larger firms. Ac-
cording to Gonzalez and Lamanna (2007), firms find informal competition as a significant threat
only in the countries with low government capacity and high regulations. They further find em-
pirical support for the hypothesis that formal firms that experience severe informal competition
actually resemble informal entities in size, age, and low entry cost to the industry.
According to Dreher and Schneider (2006) the informal economy increases corruption in low
9Market capitalisation is the share price times the number of shares outstanding.
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income countries and Sheifer and Vishny (1993) conclude that corruption has a greater adverse
effect than taxation due to the uncertainty on the amount of bribery payments . Fisman and Svens-
son (2007) estimate that one percentage point increase in the bribery rate decreases a firm’s growth
rate by more than 3 percentage points, which is a 2.5 times greater than the effect of taxation. I
use the industry average of the variable, excluding the firm itself, in order to avoid the endogeneity
problem between the informal sector and corruption. 10 Corruption in Kazakhstan is "perceived
to be widespread" and constrains the development of the small and medium size firms (SMEs)
further, which currently employs up to 30% of total employment in Kazakhstan. 11
The Government of Kazakhstan has been supporting and encouraging the private sector, specif-
ically SMEs, by implementing various programmes, including the Strategy of Industrial and In-
novation Development of Kazakhstan for 2003-2015, the Programme of Accelerated Industrial-
Innovative Development of Kazakhstan for 2010-2014, Kazakhstan - 2030, Employment roadmap
2020, Business roadmap 2020, Kazakhstan - 2050, and the latest, 100 Concrete Steps. Also pro-
grammes specifically targeting the shadow economy, such as Comprehensive Plan to Counteract
the Shadow Economy 2014-2015 and current Plan for 2015 - 2017 on the implementation of the
Anti-Corruption Strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2015-2025 and the counteraction to
the shadow economy. According to the Comprehensive Plan to Counteract the Shadow Economy,
one of the main causes of the informal economy in Kazakhstan is the migrant labour force from
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Labour migration in Kazakhstan is highly seasonal,
most migrant workers come to work in between April and August (ILO, 2009). The amount of
labour migrants in the country ranges from a quarter to one million (ILO, 2009).
10Similar to Hudson et al. (2009), this represent the average perception considering the other firms in the industry,
by excluding the firm itself.
11OECD (2016) "Multi-dimentional review of Kazakhstan", 145-146pp.
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According to AT Kearney and Schneider (2013), an annual increase in electronic payments by
10% for at least four years can decrease the share of shadow economy by up to 5%. In 2013 the
Government decree # 1743 came into force, which forced entrepreneurs carrying out certain types
of activities, like retail shops, to accept electronic payments by debit or credit cards, causing them
to install POS-terminals. The POS and online tax payments via bank cards has also been adopted.
Since shadow economy is cash based, moving towards electronic payments for goods and services
as well as taxes has played an important role in tackling informality in Kazakhstan.
According to the Doing Business indicator, labour regulations in Kazakhstan are not cumber-
some. For example, the cost of firing employees is only 4.3 months of employee’s salary and there
is no limit on the maximum length of a fixed term contract. Also, formal employment has been
steadily increasing since 2005 (Fig 2, Table 3), which signalled the shift from Soviet agricultural
economy to the service based; and increased urbanisation that reached 55% in 2013 (Statistical
Committee).
3 Data
I use the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance (BEEPS) surveys of the European
Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. BEEPS is a large dataset
that is stratified according to the firms’ sector, size, and geographical regions. The formal firms are
defined as firms registered with the State Revenue Committee, Ministry of Finance of the Republic
of Kazakhstan. Data are composed of 828 registered firms. The agricultural, banking, electric
power, rail transport, water and waste water sectors are excluded from the BEEPs sample. The
purpose of BEEPs is to study the interaction between the state and firms that are not subject to
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government price regulation and prudential provisions. The BEEPs is not surveying state owned
companies, which account for 30% to 40% of the GDP in Kazakhstan (OECD, 2016). Missing
observations and answers "’Dont know" and "Does not apply" are deleted from the dataset.
The analysis considers two periods: 2008-2009 and 2013-2014. Earlier EBRD surveys cannot
be used in my research due to inconsistency of the methodologies. I have included the stratification
levels as control variables, instead of utilising the sampling weights. The business environment is
important in determining the nature and the cost advantage of informal entities. Table 2 lists the
variables of interest. Following Lederman (2010), I included the following firm-specific variables:
the firm’s age, percentage of educated labour force, access to loans and lines of credit, if there were
tax inspections or losses due to theft for the last fiscal year, and firm size. In 2009, 35.1% of firms
faced competition from informal counterparts. In 2013 the rate of registered enterprises competing
against informal firms was 32.9%.
Table 2: Regression Variables
Variable Description
Informal Binary variable equals to 1 if practices of competitors in the
Competition informal sector was an obstacle to firm’s current operations, and 0 otherwise
Age Age of the firm
Educated workforce Number of workers with university degree
Access to finance Binary variable indicating if the firm has a line of credit or a loan
lsize logarithm of total number of employees
Losses due to theft Binary variable indicating if the firm experienced losses due to
theft, robbery, vandalism or arson in last fiscal year
Bribes Binary variable indicating if firms like you pay additional payments/ informal
gifts to "get things done", industry average excluding the respondent firm itself
Tax Binary variable indicating if tax rates are an obstacle to the current operations
industry average excluding the respondent firm itself
Transportation Categorical variable from no to major if transportation of goods,
supplies and inputs is an obstcle to current operations
Labour Binary varibale equals 1 if labour regulations is an obstacle to firm’s operations
Sector Sector dummy: manfacturing, core, retail
Region Region dummy: Northern, Southern, Central, Eastern and Western Kazakhstan
13
The summary statistics are provided in Table 8 with mean difference and Welch t-test. The
mean difference t-test is only given to continuous variables as it is straight forward to calculate
it for binary variables. The average age of firms in the survey has increased by almost one and
half years whereas firms with a line of credit or loan decreased by 52% in between 2009 and
2013. Such a drastic decline in the access to finance could be due to the following reasons: 1)
banks corporate lending has been weak since the financial crisis, 2) firms primarily rely on internal
funding (82%) due to primarily high collateral requirement, 3) government lending to the private
sector has increased through the work of JSC "Entrepreneurship Development Fund" Damu".
To evaluate industry specific effects of corruption and taxes, I estimated the weighted average
perception of other firms in the industry, excluding the firm in question. 12 It is a binary instrumen-
tal variable over 14 industry averages. Another industry specific variable included in my analysis
is tax, which explains whether the tax rate is an obstacle to a firm’s current operations. To evaluate
the effect of the business environment I use a categorical variable on transportation as an obsta-
cle to current operations and a binary variable representing if labour regulations are obstacles to
operations of the firm. 13 Labour regulations’ decline as an obstacle to current operations could
be due to the government’s aim to join the top 30 developed countries in the world by 2050 via
the Kazakhstan-2050 programme. In BEEPs surveys 2008-2009 and 2012-2013, only 28.9% of
respondents replied that labour regulations are an obstacle to their operations.
Fixed effects are included to account for the possible idiosyncratic disparities between regions
and sectors. However, due to data limitations, it was not possible to separate the capital city,
Astana, and the biggest city, Almaty, from the other regions, as well as urban and rural areas.
12The correlation between corruption and bribery is 0.35 in the sample. I chose to include bribery in my analysis as
it better represents the operational activities of the firm.
13These variables are similar to Hudson et al., 2009 and Lamanna and Gonzales, 2007.
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4 Methodology
I use fixed structure and changing structure analyses to estimate where the main drivers force
behind the decline in informal competition in Kazakhstan is due to a structured change or observed
heterogeneity, and explain to what degree the decline in informal competition can be explained by
the changes in the levels of underlying factors: corruption, taxes, crime, access to finance and the
level of education of employees and socio-economic changes.
4.1 Fixed Structure Analysis
In fixed structure analysis, I assume that the structure or relationships explaining competition
against informal firms stays the same over time. This amounts to estimating a logit regression by
treating the repeated cross section as pooled data. In this model the registered firm either competes
against informal firms (Y=1) or does not (Y=0) in the period the survey is taken, and x denotes
set of factors such as corruption, education, access to bank loans explain possible competition.
Following Greene (2012), the success probability is given by
Prob(Y = 1|x ) = exp(x β
′)
1 + exp(x β′)
= Λ(x β′), (1)
with the corresponding marginal effects:
∂E[y|x]
∂x
=
exp(x β′)
[1 + exp(x β′)]2
= Λ(x β′)[1− Λ(x β′)]
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I then assess the roles of changes in independent variables in explaining the changes in the proba-
bility of informal via:
Λ(x β′)[1− Λ(x β′)](X¯20012−13 − X¯2008−09) (2)
In words, I estimate the amount of informal competition change due to the changes in independent
variables, by multiplying each change in the probability of informal competition due to change in
the variable Xi by the actual mean change in that variable occurring between the two periods.
4.2 Changing Structure Analysis
Fixed structure analysis does not account for the changes in the economic factors that might have
affected the informal competition. It is possible that due to financial crisis of 2008-2010 and
implementation of various government programmes, the underlying structure of the informal com-
petition have changed. To evaluate the role of the structural change, I first estimate a logit model
for each period separately. Next I test whether the coefficients in two regressions differ for each
variable. In order to evaluate the effect of various factors on the competition against informal
firms, I take the logit coefficients of 2008-2009 and multiple them by the average of explanatory
variables in 2012-2013. To see how well the earlier structure would have predicted informal com-
petition rate, I then repeat the process backwards to understand how well later structure forcasts
the earlier informal competition rate. Thereafter, I estimate the portion attributable to overall struc-
tural change by taking the difference between the actual informal competition and predicted by that
16
period’s structure.
Prob(Y = 1, year = 2008− 09|x 2012−13) = exp(x2012−13β
′
2008−09)
[1 + exp(x 2012−13β′2008−09)]
Prob(Y = 1, year = 2012− 13|x 2008−09) = exp(x2008−09β
′
2012−13)
[1 + exp(x 2008−09β′2012−13)]
(3)
5 Empirical Results
Standard Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is based on a matrix of Pearson’s correlations and
assumes that the variables are continuous and follow a multivariate normal distribution. I use PCA
to understand which variables contain the most variance since my model includes variables that are
dichotomous, ordinal and continuous, PCA is performed using a polychoric/polyserial correlation
matrix.
According to Kolenikov and Angeles (2009), in the polyserial correlation computation, the
likelihood for the latent variable x1 with underlying standard normal x∗1 discretized according to
the thresholds α1,0 = ∞ < α1,1 < ... < α1,K1 < α1,K = ∞, and the continuous variable x2
(assumed to have the standard normal distribution) the following way:
L(ρ, α;x1 = k, x2) = f(x1 = k, x2; ρ, α)
= Prob[α1,k−1 < x∗1 6 α1,k|x2]φ(x2)
= (Φ(α1,k − ρx2)− Φ(α1,k−1 − ρx2))φ(x2)
E[x∗1|x2] = ρx2 (4)
To obtain polyserial correlation, the expression has to be maximised with respect to α and ρ,
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assuming independence of observations to sum up the log-likelihood. After the correlations are es-
timated, the next step is to proceed to the PCA through solving the eigenproblem for the estimated
correlation matrix. In Stata, polychoric correlation matrix takes into account types of variables,
hence when variables are binary, a polychoric correlation is calculated; when variables are contin-
uous and categorical, a polyserial correlation is calculated, and if all variables are continuous, then
Pearson’s correlation is taken into account.
The polychoric PCA results are shown in Tables 4-7. In Table 4 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)
test, which measures sampling adequacy both overall and for each variable, is equal to 0.55. The
KMO estimate can be interpreted as miserable implying that variables share low level of common
factors. However, as my data fail to reject the Bartlett’s test of sphericity with null-hypothesis
that the variables are intercorrelated at 1% level of significance, there is evidenec in favour of
conducting polychoric PCA.
Table 5 provides the correlation matrix where the highest observed correlation is between bribe
and tax of 0.404, followed by labour regulation and losses due to theft -0.369, and transportation
and labour regulation 0.379.
As for polychoric principle components analysis (Table 6), where first 5 eigenvalues are greater
than 1. These components explain only 63.6% of the total variation. However, all the factors
contribute to the total variance, and according to the scree rule, I include all the variables in my
regressions. As the variables of interest are not highly intercorrelated, given low KMO, along with
the results from correlation matrix, I proceed further with all 11 variables for my fixed and changing
structure analysis. Table 7 also shows scoring coefficient or loadings. The first components is
related to access to finance, labour regulations, losses due to theft and transportation as an obstacle
to firms’ operations. The second component is related to age, firm size, bribes, taxes, regions and
18
sectors.
5.1 Fixed Structure Analysis
Tables 9 and 10 show logit regression that explains the competition against informal firms and
the decomposition of the decrease in the informal competition between 2008-2009 and 2012-2013
respectivey, assuming the same structure of relationships remain the same in both periods. The
firm’s size is important as evidence by Lamanna and Gonzales (2010), since smaller firms expe-
rience competition from unregistered firms more strongly. One percentage increase in size of the
firm holding other variables at mean decreases probability of competition against informal firms
by 3.4%. Firms which experience losses due to theft or vandalism and firms with a higher per-
centage of an educated workforce are less likely to compete against unregistered entities. More
importantly, industry specific bribes are significant and positive, meaning that if the firms in the
industry give bribes to get things done, they are on average 71.4% more likely to compete against
informal entities. Firms operating in the southern region and in the services sector are more likely
to compete against informal firms by 17.4% and 10.8%, respectively. Bribes and losses due to theft
may be endogenous due to unobserved heterogeneity.
To evaluate the decline in informal competition due to changes in each explanatory variable,
the mean difference of two periods is multiplied by regression coefficients. The sum of all the
entries explain only 0.18% of the decline in informal competition.
Firm size and entrepreneurship in the Southern part of Kazakhstan have largely contributed to
the increase in the rate of informal competition. Modest contributions were made by all the other
regions, core sector and age of the firm. The result indicates that the level of the university educated
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labour force, access to finance, theft, transportation as a major obstacle and the services sector are
the main contributors to the part of the decline in the informal competition between periods that
we are able to explain. The estimations show holding everything at their overall sample means that
labour regulations, as well as the firm size and southern region contributed to an increase in the
rate of informal competition by 5.2%. Holding firm size, labour regulations and regions variables
constant, the level of the university educated labour force, access to finance, theft, transportation
as a major obstacle and the services sector contribute to 5.4% decline in the informal competition.
Although some factors have accounted for the decline in the rate of informal competition and
others have increased it even further, I am unable to explain the majority of the actual decline with
these variable changes. Further, I estimate whether some of the relationships between informal
competition and its determinants have changed over time and if these might help to explain the
decline in informal competition.
5.2 Structural Change Analysis
To analyse if the coefficients have changed over time, I run separate logit regression for each
period (Table 11). The Welch t-test indicates if coefficients of each variable differs significantly
between periods, where educated workforce, transportation as no to minor obstacle to operations,
labour regulations and northern region are significant. Change in firm size, losses due to theft
and the southern region are significant in both periods. One percent decrease in the size of the
firm, decreases the probability of competition from informal firms holding all variables at mean
by 3.9% in 2008-2009 and by 4.6% in 2012-2013. The importance of transportation as a minor
obstacle and the services sector are significant in the period 2008-2009; and in the 2012-2013
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period an educated labour force, labour regulations, and central and northern regions are more
important. Transportation became less of an obstacle to a firm’s operations, and firms that consider
transportation as no or a minor obstacle are less likely to compete against informal entities with
respect to ones considering it as a moderate obstacle by 10.4% and 8.7% in 2012-13, respectively.
The probability of competition from informal firms due to transportation from no to a minor and
labour regulations obstacle has changed sign from more likely to less likely, the opposite happened
in the northern region. Transportation has become less of an obstacle for a firm’s operations from
2008 to 2013. As for the northern region, which includes Astana, the probability of competing
against informal firms became 24.2% more likely in 2013 from -0.33% in 2008. This could be
primarily due to construction and trade in Astana. The firm size, educated workforce, losses due
to theft, service sector and southern region are persistently significant for separate periods as well
as merged into one pooled period. The firm size, theft and educated workforce have contributed to
the decline of informal competition; and the southern region and the service sector assisted in its
increase.
Since several coefficients differ in their effect on the rate of informal competition, I further es-
timate the relative importance of these structural changes versus changes in variables in explaining
the informal competition decline between periods by seeing how well 2008-2009 coefficient and
the 2012-2013 values of explanatory variables predict the 2012-2013 informal competition rate.
The difference between the predicted 2008-2009 informal rate and the actual 2012-2013 rate is
the portion of informal competition decline attributable to changes in variables. This difference
between the predicted 2012-2013 informal competition rate and the actual 2012-2013 rate is the
portion of informality decline due to structural change (i.e. coefficients). In doing so I am in-
terested in how well I would have predicted the informal competition rate while only knowing
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2008-2009 coefficients. Table 11 shows the prediction of the informal competition rate. In 2008-
2009 the actual rate of the informal competition was 35.1% and the predicted value was estimated
at the level of 38.9%, while the actual rate of informal competition has declined to 32.9%. I came
to a similar conclusion while repeating the same exercise backwards.
I conclude that a substantial part of the decline in the informal competition rate between 2008-
2009 and 2012-2013 is due to changes in the structure of the informal competition. Hence, struc-
tural changes between 2008 and 2012 as well as the determinants of informal competition in 2012
have contributed to a decline in informality. This research is beneficial from the public policy per-
spective since it shows how effective government policies were in tackling informality, which is of
great interest to the Kazakhstani government.
6 Conclusion
Kazakhstan is a developing country, with a higher GDP per capita compared to other Central
Asian countries, and a large shadow economy, which is attributable to countries with low institu-
tional quality. The loss of revenue to the government in the form of income and social tax due to
the informal employment in 2014 was 70 million USD. The Comprehensive Plan to Counteract the
Shadow Economy and other government policies are aiming to decrease the underground economy
because the informal economy can make entrepreneurship less profitable, obstruct investment, un-
dermine the development of the private-sector, and diminish social protection, thereby reducing
economic growth and wealth. On the other hand, the shadow economy can also provide a much
needed source of income for a larger number of people. According to the Ernst & Young (2012)
survey, 50% of respondents feel that the level of legal and regulatory transparency and predictabil-
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ity is insufficient in Kazakhstan. The significance of bribes highlights the need for reform. The
government is currently implementing an e-government initiative and other substantial reforms to
tackle the problem of the shadow economy. The rate of informal competition persists in retail
(bazaars), agricultural and construction sectors due to the seasonality of work and high migrant
work force in these seasonal jobs (World Bank, 2014). As a result, firms in retail, real-estate and
construction companies who work legally and pay taxes compete against unregistered firms with a
high burden.
The average size of shadow economy in between 1999 and 2015 was 39.7% in Russia, where
the same statistics for Turkey was 30.1% of GDP (Schneider, 2016). The main determinants of
informal economy in Russia are corruption, taxes and unemployment (Schneider, 2016).
This study has identified several factors contributing to the decline in the informal competition
between 2008-2009 and 2012-2013 in Kazakhstan. The research has also estimated factors that
have prevented the informal competition rate from decreasing even further. Out of 2.2 percentage
points decline in informal competition, 0.18 percentage point is explained by the observable het-
erogeneity whereas the rest is due to structural changes. The decrease in the average firm size and
increased entrepreneurship in the southern part of Kazakhstan have prevented the decrease in the
informal competition from being even higher. An educated workforce, access to finance, losses
due to theft, transportation as a major obstacle and the services sector were the main contributors
behind the decline in the informal competition. In order to combat the shadow economy, the gov-
ernment of Kazakhstan should continue with the reforms and supporting the private sector through
ongoing Business Roadmap 2020, Employment Roadmap 2020 and other similar programmes.
The educated workforce and size of the firms, the two determinants of the informal competition,
that could be further enhanced to tackle the problem. Another factor (Table 10) that decreases
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informality is labour regulations, which has already been substantially eased.
Taxes and labour regulations do not seem to be as powerful factors as expected. Since not all
industries and sectors were covered under the BEEPs survey, it is possible for other factors beyond
those reviewed here to influence rate of informal competition. To curb the informal economy
and rate of informal competition, it is worth working on the improvement of the institutional and
the regulatory framework in Kazakhstan. The results would be more robust if the sales, total
tax expense and bribes as percent of sales data were fully available. It would be interesting to
evaluate how the informal economy affects the government revenue, job creation rates and worker
compensation in the future.
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8 Appendices
Table 3: Formal and Informal Employment in Kazakhstan, 2006-2015
Year Employment in registered firms in informal firms in subsistent farming
total formal informal formal informal formal informal producing agricultural paid workers who
products for own provide domestic
consumption services
2005 726100 4148200 3112700 3428400 1162000 719800 603500 1347200
2006 7 403 494 4 281 909 3 121 585 3 580 594 1 143 780 701 315 702 257 1 223 279 52 269
2007 7 631 109 4 545 531 3 085 578 3 767 657 1 158 936 777 874 685 074 1 194 692 46 876
2008 7 857 200 4 780 703 3 076 497 4 044 518 1 107 271 736 185 755 436 1 166 141 47 649
2009 7 903 368 4 886 920 3 016 448 3 742 219 544 401 1 144 701 1 291 131 1 125 529 55 387
2010 8 114 165 5 111 762 3 002 403 3 933 123 516 219 1 178 639 1 366 923 1 068 978 50 283
2011 8 301 635 5 348 136 2 953 499 4 057 865 550 382 1 290 271 1 317 497 1 042 231 43 389
2012 8 507 152 6 291 604 2 215 548 4 534 469 307 305 1 757 135 970 540 936 386 1 317
2013 8 570 648 6 490 102 2 080 546 4 744 030 265 478 1 746 072 1 359 394 452 681 2 993
2014 8 510 074 6 380 995 2 129 079 6 380 995 1 034 547 - 798 961 277 977 17 594
2015 8 623 754 6 643 750 1 980 004 6 643 750 994 068 - 787 712 190 441 7 783
in percent
2005 100% 56.0% 42.0% 82.6% 37.3% 17.4% 19.4% 43.3%
2006 100% 57.8% 42.2% 83.6% 36.6% 16.4% 22.5% 39.2% 1.7%
2007 100% 61.4% 41.7% 82.9% 37.6% 17.1% 22.2% 38.7% 1.5%
2008 100% 64.6% 41.6% 84.6% 36.0% 15.4% 24.6% 37.9% 1.5%
2009 100% 66.0% 40.7% 76.6% 18.0% 23.4% 42.8% 37.3% 1.8%
2010 100% 69.0% 40.6% 76.9% 17.2% 23.1% 45.5% 35.6% 1.7%
2011 100% 72.2% 39.9% 75.9% 18.6% 24.1% 44.6% 35.3% 1.5%
2012 100% 85.0% 29.9% 72.1% 13.9% 27.9% 43.8% 42.3% 0.1%
2013 100% 87.7% 28.1% 73.1% 12.8% 26.9% 65.3% 21.8% 0.1%
2014 100% 86.2% 28.8% 100.0% 48.6% - 37.5% 13.1% 0.8%
2015 100% 89.7% 26.7% 100.0% 50.2% 39.8% 9.6% 0.4%
*Source: Committee of Statistics, Republic of Kazakhstan
Data for subsistent farming in 2005 is the sum of own consumption and paid work
Figure 4: The self-employed/informal and formal employees wage distribution , 2014
Source: OECD Development Pathway "Multidimentional review of Kazakhstan" Vol1. Initial Assessment (2016) page 59, Table 2.18: Mun D. et al (2015), “Social spending, taxes and income
redistribution in Kazakhstan”, Background Paper for the MDCR of Kazakhstan.
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Table 4: Factor test
Determinant of the correlation matrix 0.506
Bartlett test of sphericity
Chi-square 558.885
Degrees of freedom 55
p-value 0.000
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 0.55
Table 5: Polychoric correlation matrix
Age Educated Access to finance lsize Losses due to theft Bribe Tax Transportation Labour regulation Region Sector
Age 1
Educated 0.042 1
Access to finance -0.008 -0.096 1
lsize 0.153 -0.117 0.379 1
Losses due to theft 0.023 0.059 -0.318 -0.191 1
Bribe -0.024 -0.037 0.019 -0.05 0.057 1
Tax -0.035 -0.096 -0.038 -0.037 -0.046 0.404 1
Transportation -0.086 -0.018 0.134 0.113 -0.217 0.0142 0.034 1
Labour regulation -0.002 -0.041 0.131 0.141 -0.369 0.097 0.113 0.379 1
Region -0.054 0.094 -0.103 -0.062 0.041 0.055 0.034 0.181 0.041 1
Sector -0.118 0.063 -0.005 -0.092 -0.047 0.265 0.037 -0.052 0.033 0.071 1
Table 6: Polychoric Principal Component Analysis
Eigenvalues Proportion explained Cum. explained
1 1.990009 0.180910 0.180910
2 1.616183 0.146926 0.327836
3 1.281701 0.116518 0.444354
4 1.073430 0.097585 0.541938
5 1.037990 0.094363 0.636301
6 0.910281 0.082753 0.719054
7 0.797013 0.072456 0.791510
8 0.704166 0.064015 0.855525
9 0.596699 0.054245 0.909770
10 0.533720 0.048520 0.958290
11 0.458807 0.041710 1.00000
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Table 7: Scoring coefficients
Variable Coeff. 1 Coeff. 2 Coeff. 3
Age -0.000123 -0.232051 -0.211018
Educated labour force -0.158522 0.020407 0.386837
Access to finance
No -0.219095 0.090114 0.110382
Yes 0.502332 -0.206610 -0.253079
lsize 0.389211 -0.278720 -0.237219
Losses due to theft
Yes 0.708314 -0.038064 0.102098
No -0.158543 0.008520 -0.022853
Bribe 0.053667 0.572254 -0.345334
Tax 0.096069 0.489647 -0.336152
Transportation
No obstacle -0.386540 -0.120434 -0.418386
Minor obstacle -0.003046 -0.000949 -0.003297
Moderate obstacle 0.185755 0.057875 0.201059
Major obstacle 0.514314 0.160244 0.556687
Labour regulation
No -0.233912 -0.087747 -0.103208
Yes 0.545607 0.204672 0.240736
Region
Central 0.013918 -0.431386 -0.809362
Eastern 0.007578 -0.234870 -0.440661
Northern 0.003054 -0.094650 -0.177582
Southern -0.003142 0.097401 0.182743
Western -0.012003 0.372034 0.698007
Sector
Manufacturing 0.014822 -0.433008 0.037144
Services -0.000190 0.005550 -0.000476
Core -0.015118 0.441641 -0.037884
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Table 8: Summary Statistics
Total 2008-2009 2012-2013 Mean difference
mean sd mean sd mean sd diff t-test
Informal 0.341 0.474 0.351 0.478 0.329 0.471 -0.022
Age 11.106 8.036 10.431 6.702 11.825 9.202 1.395∗ (2.479)
Educated workforce 39.118 29.087 33.389 27.363 45.219 29.655 11.831∗∗∗ (5.955)
Access to finance 0.301 0.459 0.400 0.491 0.195 0.396 -0.206
Firm size, log 3.397 1.256 3.745 1.284 3.029 1.115 -0.715∗∗∗ (-8.554)
Losses due to theft 1.816 0.387 1.792 0.407 1.843 0.364 0.051
Bribes 0.603 0.052 0.604 0.053 0.601 0.051 -0.003 (-0.914)
Taxes 0.732 0.086 0.752 0.091 0.710 0.074 -0.042∗∗∗ (-7.388)
Transportation: no obstacle 0.397 0.490 0.323 0.468 0.476 0.500 0.153-
Transportation: minor obstacle 0.200 0.401 0.150 0.357 0.254 0.436 0.104
Transportation:moderate obstacle 0.162 0.369 0.148 0.355 0.177 0.382 0.030
Transportation: major obstacle 0.240 0.428 0.379 0.486 0.092 0.290 -0.287
Labour regulations 0.298 0.458 0.365 0.482 0.227 0.419 -0.138
Region: Central 0.118 0.323 0.115 0.319 0.122 0.328 0.007
Region: Eastern 0.133 0.340 0.178 0.383 0.085 0.279 -0.093
Region: Northern 0.221 0.415 0.213 0.410 0.229 0.421 0.016
Region: Southern 0.348 0.477 0.290 0.454 0.409 0.492 0.119
Region: Western 0.180 0.384 0.204 0.403 0.155 0.362 -0.049
Sector: manufacturing 0.329 0.470 0.326 0.469 0.332 0.471 0.006
Sector: services 0.356 0.479 0.386 0.487 0.324 0.469 -0.062
Sector: core 0.315 0.465 0.288 0.453 0.344 0.476 0.056
Observations 828 427 401 828
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Logit Regression explaining informal competition and decomposition of the decrease in
the informal competition rate between 2008-2009 and 2012-2013, assuming the same structure of
relationships in both periods
Logit regression Mean Change
logit dydx difference due to variable
Age 0.001 0.000 1.395∗∗ 0.000
(0.009) (0.002) (0.557)
Educated workforce -0.011∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 11.831∗∗∗ -0.027
(0.003) (0.001) (1.982)
Access to finance 0.244 0.051 -0.206∗∗∗ -0.010
(0.185) (0.039) (0.031)
Firm size, log -0.162∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.715∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.070) (0.014) (0.084)
Losses due to theft -0.493∗∗ -0.104∗∗ 0.051∗ -0.005
(0.203) (0.042) (0.027)
Bribes 3.395∗ 0.714∗ -0.003 -0.002
(1.813) (0.378) (0.004)
Taxes 0.483 0.102 -0.042∗∗∗ -0.004
(1.010) (0.212) (0.006)
Transportation: no obstacle -0.049 -0.010 0.153∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.228) (0.047) (0.034)
Transportation: minor obstacle 0.122 0.026 0.104∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.251) (0.053) (0.028)
Transportation: major obstacle 0.089 0.019 -0.287∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.253) (0.053) (0.028)
Labour regulations -0.230 -0.048 -0.138∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.182) (0.038) (0.031)
Central 0.370 0.073 0.007 0.000
(0.291) (0.058) (0.022)
Eastern -0.097 -0.017 -0.093∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.300) (0.053) (0.023)
Northern 0.407 0.081 0.016 0.001
(0.252) (0.049) (0.029)
Southern 0.825∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.237) (0.047) (0.033)
Sector: services -0.517∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ 0.062∗ -0.007
(0.196) (0.041) (0.033)
Sector: core 0.301 0.061 0.056∗ 0.003
(0.202) (0.041) (0.032)
Constant -1.961∗
(1.172)
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; χ2 [17] = 52.01, p=0.000
Transportation reference category: moderate; Region reference category: Western;
Sector reference category: manufacturing.
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Table 10: Decomposition of the decrease in the informal competition rate between 2008-2009 and
2012-2013, assuming the same structure of relationships in both periods
Mean Change
difference due to variable
Informal competition -2.2%
Age 1.395∗∗ 0.000
Educated workforce 11.831∗∗∗ -0.027
Access to finance -0.206 -0.010
Firm size, log -0.715∗∗∗ 0.024
Losses due to theft 0.051 -0.005
Bribes -0.003 -0.002
Taxes -0.042∗∗∗ -0.004
Transportation: no obstacle 0.153 -0.001
Transportation: minor obstacle 0.104 0.002
Transportation: major obstacle -0.287 -0.005
Labour regulations -0.138 0.007
Central 0.007 0.000
Eastern -0.093 0.001
Northern 0.016 0.001
Southern 0.119 0.021
Sector: services 0.062 -0.007
Sector: core 0.056 0.003
Σ of informal competition
due to variables -0.18%
Transportation reference category: moderate; Region reference category: Western;
Sector reference category: manufacturing.
Table 12: Competition against informal firms: predictions based on Table 11
Item 2008-09 2012-13
Observed informality 35.1% 32.9%
Predicted informality
2009 2013 change due to
explanatory variables
Predicted informality using 2009 coefficients 35.1% 38.87% 3.77%
Predicted informality using 2013 coefficients 34.3% 32.9% -1.4%
Change due to change in structure -0.8% -5.97%
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Table 11: Logit regression explaining informal competition for the 2008-2009 and 2012-2013
periods, allowing the structure of relationships to differ between the periods
Period 2008-09 Period 2012-13
logit dydx logit dydx t-test*
Age 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.00
(0.017) (0.003) (0.013) (0.002) (0.952)
Educated workforce -0.004 -0.001 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 5.72∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.016)
Access to finance 0.187 0.039 0.253 0.049 0.03
(0.245) (0.051) (0.318) (0.061) (0.87)
Firm size, log -0.189∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.237∗ -0.046∗∗ 0.09
(0.098) (0.020) (0.122) (0.023) (0.761)
Losses due to theft -0.447∗ -0.093∗ -0.694∗∗ -0.134∗∗ 0.34
(0.271) (0.056) (0.330) (0.062) (0.562)
Bribes 3.773 0.782 2.061 0.398 0.19
(2.534) (0.522) (2.945) (0.567) (0.659)
Taxes 0.095 0.020 1.362 0.263 0.30
(1.471) (0.305) (1.795) (0.346) (0.584)
Transportation: no obstacle 0.308 0.062 -0.527 -0.104 2.94∗
(0.355) (0.070) (0.334) (0.067) (0.086)
Transportation: minor obstacle 0.834∗∗ 0.179∗∗ -0.438 -0.087 5.83∗∗
(0.388) (0.080) (0.357) (0.072) (0.015)
Transportation: major obstacle 0.063 0.012 0.502 0.108 0.56
(0.347) (0.067) (0.472) (0.102) (0.453)
Labour regulations 0.064 0.013 -0.758∗∗ -0.146∗∗ 4.02∗∗
(0.240) (0.050) (0.332) (0.063) (0.045)
Central 0.042 0.009 0.760∗ 0.124∗ 1.43
(0.390) (0.079) (0.457) (0.076) (0.231)
Eastern -0.266 -0.051 -0.085 -0.011 0.08
(0.372) (0.071) (0.543) (0.071) (0.782)
Northern -0.169 -0.033 1.340∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 8.05∗∗∗
(0.353) (0.069) (0.398) (0.066) (0.004)
Southern 0.867∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 1.177∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.39
(0.323) (0.069) (0.380) (0.059) (0.533)
Sector: services 0.734∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.148 0.028 1.75
(0.282) (0.057) (0.342) (0.065) (0.186)
Sector: core 0.483 0.096 0.258 0.050 0.26
(0.311) (0.062) (0.308) (0.060) (0.607)
Constant -2.358 -0.820 0.37
(1.693) (1.879) (0.542)
N 424 424 401 401
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
For period 2008-09: χ2 [17] = 38.77, p=0.002; for period 2012-13: χ2 [17] = 46.14, p=0.000.
Transportation reference category: moderate; Region reference category: Western;
Sector reference category: manufacturing.
* Welch t-test, in parentheses the p-value.
